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Abstract: Logical Probability (LP) is strictly distinguished from Statistical 
Probability (SP). To measure semantic information or confirm hypotheses, we need to 
use sampling distribution (conditional SP function) to test or confirm fuzzy truth 
function (conditional LP function). The Semantic Information Measure (SIM) 
proposed is compatible with Shannon’s information theory and Fisher’s likelihood 
method. It can ensure that the less the LP of a predicate is and the larger the true value 
of the proposition is, the more information there is. So the SIM can be used as Popper's 
information criterion for falsification or test. The SIM also allows us to optimize the 
true-value of counterexamples or degrees of disbelief in a hypothesis to get the 
optimized degree of belief, i. e. Degree of Confirmation (DOC). To explain 
confirmation, this paper 1) provides the calculation method of the DOC of universal 
hypotheses; 2) discusses how to resolve Raven Paradox with new DOC and its 
increment; 3) derives the DOC of rapid HIV tests: DOC of “+” 
=1-(1-specificity)/sensitivity, which is similar to Likelihood Ratio 
(=sensitivity/(1-specificity)) but has the upper limit 1; 4) discusses negative DOC for 
excessive affirmations, wrong hypotheses, or lies; and 5) discusses the DOC of general 
hypotheses with GPS as example.  
1. Introduction 
Popper’s method of falsification (1935/1959; 1963/2005) uses semantic 
information as criterion to test and evaluate hypotheses. Therefore, it needs a proper 
Semantic Information Measure (SIM). Modern inductive method (Hempel, 1945; 
Carnap, 1952; Eells, 2000; Hawthorne, 2004/2012) on the other hand, uses samples to 
confirm hypotheses. As a result, it needs a proper confirmation measure, i. e., Degree 
of Confirmation (DOC). There have been many SIMs (Bar-Hillel and Rudolf, 1952；
Klir, 2005; Floridi, 2004, 2005/2015; Adriaans ,2010; D’Alfonso, 2011) and DOCs 
(Carnap, 1952; Popper, 1963/2005, 388; Earman,1992; Milne, 1996; Joyce, 1999; 
Christensen. 1999; Fitelson, 1999; Tentori et al, 2007). However, this paper tries to 
provide more reasonable SIM and DOC, so that the two methods (Falsification and 
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Confirmation) are mutually compatible and moreover, compatible with Shannon’s 
Information Theory (1948) and Fisher’s Likelihood method. (Aldrich, 1997)    
After Akaike (1974) revealed relationship between Fisher’s LM and 
Kullback-Leibler divergence (1951), an information measure, some researchers, 
including the author, realized that we should use a number of samples instead of one 
to construct both SIM and likelihood for falsification and confirmation. (Hawthorne, 
2004/2014) 
The author had proposed a SIM with sampling distribution (conditional LP) and 
Fuzzy Truth Function (FTF, conditional LP) (Lu, 1991, 1993, 1999). This measure is 
compatible with Shannon’s Information Theory and Popper’s Falsification Theory or 
Hypothesis-testing Theory. Recently, the author found that this measure were also 
compatible with Fisher’s LM and could be used for DOC. In researching about birds’ 
sexual selection, the author proposed a hypothesis that the colorful plumages of many 
birds reflect their demands for foods. While measuring the semantic information of 
hypothesis “Birds with yellow feather like eating nectar or pollen”, the author found 
that he could modify the true value of counterexamples or Degree of Disbelief (DOD) 
in a hypothesis to reduce information loss from the counterexamples and increase the 
average semantic information. The Degree of Belief (DOB) is determined by the 
equation DOD=1-|DOB|. The DOC is defined as the optimized DOB with SIM as 
criterion. Hence the author concludes that for any universal hypothesis, given a 
sampling distribution, the optimized DOB, i.e. DOC, exists and allows the average 
semantic information to reaches its upper limit: Kullback-Leibler Information, a 
special case of Shannon Mutual Information. 
The methods introduced in this paper are largely different from those popular 
methods. First, this paper strictly distinguishes Statistical Probability (SP, denoted by 
P) from Logical Probability (LP, denoted by T), but use two types of probability 
together to test and confirm hypotheses. The P means probability in which an event 
occurs, and T means probability in which a hypothesis is judged true by different 
people or in different cases. The SP is divided into objective probability (in which real 
events occur) and subjective probability or likelihood (predicted by hypotheses or 
their truth functions).   
Second, this paper strictly distinguishes the LP of a predicate (the less, the better) 
from the true value of the corresponding proposition (the larger, the better), and 
avoids talking “the logical probability of a proposition”.  
In this paper, small letters e1, e2… em denote different individuals or evidences in 
set A; capital E denotes a variable taking a value from A; that is E∈A= {e1, e2… em}. 
E =ei means that ei occurs. Similarly, H denotes one of hypotheses or predicates h1, 
h2… hn in set B, and H∈B= {h1, h2… hn}. H=hj means that hj is selected. After hj is 
selected, if E=ei, then there is proposition hj(ei). Aj denotes a fuzzy subset of A (Zadeh, 
1965) so that the membership grade ∈[0,1] of ei in Aj is the fuzzy true value of hj(ei), 
denoted by T(hj|ei) or T(Aj|ei). Hence the truth function of predicate hj(E) is T(hj|E) or 
T(Aj|E). To resove Bar-hillel-Carnap Paradox (BCP), Floridi (2004) emphasizes to use 
truthlikeness to measure semantic information. The fuzzy true-value T(Aj|ei) is the 
truthlikeness used by the author. 
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Figure 1 Two types of probability for Information and Confirmation 
——A new frame for hypothesis testing and induction2 
Figure 1 shows how two types of probability are put together to form semantic 
information measure for tests, confirmations, and optimizations of hypotheses. The 
solid arrows means that we may get an item from other items. For example, we may 
get LP T(Aj) from P(E) and T(Aj|E). Yet P(hj|E) is an exception. In some cases, P(hj|E) 
that already exists is prior unknown and can only be obtained by experiments, or 
derived from P(E), P(E|hj), and P(hj) by Bayes’ formula. The dotted arrows means the 
test, confirmation, or optimization of a hypothesis by objective conditional probability 
functions. 
This paper first introduces the content in Figure 1, beginning from Fuzzy Truth 
Function (FTF); and then discusses the calculations of DOC in various cases, which is 
the main task of this paper. 
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2. Fuzzy Truth Function, Logical Probability, Statistical 
Probability, and Likelihood  
In daily language, the truth-falsity of a statement is generally fuzzy. For example, 
statement “The thief is about 20 years old” is fuzzy. Its true value should be between 
0 and 1. If the thief is actually 20 years old, the true value is 1. If there is deviation, 
true value will be less. For example, if his age is 25 years, the true value is about 0.8. 
If his age is 50 years, the true value is close to 0. So, the interval of true values is [0, 1] 
instead of {0, 1}. In the following sections, the “truth function” means FTF in most 
cases. 
A typical example of semantic communication is weather forecast. Let E denote 
rainfall and H denote a rainfall forecast. A possible forecast is hj=“There will be 
moderate or heavy rain tomorrow”. Another typical example of semantic 
communication is numerical prediction or estimation: “E is about ej” which may be 
written in hj(E) =“E≈ej”. In mathematics, “E≈ej” is often denoted by êj. Estimations 
include not only those made in natural language and mathematics, but also the arrow 
of the Global Positioning System (GPS), the needles of a watch, or the indicators of 
various meters, and even a color sensation, as shown in Table 1. 
Zadeh (1965) uses membership function ( )
jA
m E  to define a fuzzy set Aj. The 
membership function also means the truth function of a predicate hj(E) =“E∈Aj”. 
This paper follows Zadeh to define truth function T(hj|E). To emphasize the semantic 
meaning hj(E) = “E∈Aj”, we also write T(hj|E) as T(Aj|E) in some cases. That is to 
define 
( | ) ( | ) ( )
jj j A
T h E T A E m E       (1) 
This function displays as a curve as shown in Figure 2. When E=ei, T(Aj|E) 
becomes the true value T(Aj| ei) of a proposition. 
Table 1 Estimations (hj=“E≈ej”) and their true values 
Examples Estimation hj=“E≈ej”  Evidence  E,  
a variable 
Evidence ei,  
a constant 
T(Aj|ei), true value of hj(ei)
Daily 
language 
“The thief is about 20 
years old” 
Real age 18 years old 0.9 
Economical 
prediction 
“The stock index will go 
up about 20% this year” 
Real rising 
percentage 
5% 0.3 
balance Reading  of  a balance, 
such as  “1KG” 
Real weight 0.9KG 0.2 
GPS Arrow ↖ on a map Real position Right 10 meters away  0.8 
Color vision color sensation such as 
yellow sensation 
Real color with 
some dominant 
wavelength 
Color with dominant 
wavelength 570 nm 
(typical yellow). 
1 
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We could also treat ej, which makes T(Aj|ej) =1, as Idea (proposed by Ancient 
Greek philosopher Plato) of Aj, and hence membership grade ( )
jA i
m e is similarity 
degree or confusion probability of ei with the Idea ej. So, we use not only the 
occurring probability of objective messages as in the classical information theory but 
also subjective confusion probability. 
Where do truth functions come from? The truth functions of natural language 
come from usages. Later, the author will prove that T(Aj|E) comes from selecting rule 
function P(hj|E). Without knowing past P(hj|E), we could still get T(Aj|E) from the 
statistics of a random set (Wang and Sanchez, 1982). Actually, a fuzzy hypothesis (or 
its truth function) is similar to a predictive model (or its parameters’ set) in statistics, 
such as in the Maximum Likelihood Method (MLE) (Aldrich, 1997). If hj is an 
unbiased estimation, its truth function may be approximately written as 
T(Aj|E) =exp [-(E-ej)2/(2d2)]     (2) 
where d is standard deviation. The larger the d is, the fuzzier the estimation is. 
Note that the maximum of truth function T(Aj|E) is 1.  
Unlike other popular methods for measuring semantic information, this paper 
strictly distinguishes LP from SP, and uses both to measure semantic information.  
First, E or ei is a fact or evidence. It only has SP P(E), without LP T(E). In 
practice, if one suspects that an evidence is false, one may use a hypothesis with true 
value between 0 and 1 to replace it.  
Second, a hypothesis hj=hj(E) has both SP (selected probability P(hj)) in which hj 
is selected, and also LP (denoted by T(hj) =T(Aj)) in which hj(E) is judged true. They 
are generally different. Consider hypotheses h1=“There will be small rain”, h2=“There 
will be moderate rain”, and h3=“There will be small to moderate rain”. According to 
their semantic meanings, T(h3) ≈T(h1)+T(h2); yet, there may be P(h3) <P(h1). The LP 
of tautology is 1; yet its selected probability is close to 0.  
Third, SP is normalized (an exception will be talked late), for examples, 
P(e1)+P(e2)+…+P(em)=1; P(h1)+P(h2)+…+P(hn)=1, and 
P(e1|hj)+P(e2|hj)+…+P(em|hj)=1; Yet, LP is not normalized and has the maximum 1. 
Generally, T(Aj|e1)+ T(Aj|e2)+…+ T(Aj|em)>1; T(A1)+ T(A2)+…+ T(An)>1 because A1, 
A1, …, An are not disjoint. Only when they are disjoint and hypotheses h1, h2… hn are 
always correctly selected, T(Aj) =P(hj), j=1, 2… n.   
Averaging truth function, we get the LP of predicate hj (E):  
( ) ( ) ( | )j i j i
i
T A P e T A e         (3) 
This is just the fuzzy set probability defined by Zadeh. (1986)  
Note that the LP of a predicate in this paper is different from the true value of a 
predicate in mathematical logic, which is equal to T(hj|e1)∧T(hj|e2)∧…∧T(hj|em), 
because 1) the true value in Mathematical Logic can only be 0 or 1, yet the LP can be 
any value between 0 and 1; 2) the true value is irrelative to P(E), yet the LP is related 
to P(E); 3) the true value is posterior, yet, the LP is prior. 
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The LP defined by Eq. (3) is also different from the LP defined by Bar-hillel and 
Carnap (1952) and others (Floridi, 2004), which is also irrelative to P(E). For example, 
according to their definition, three predicates divide the logical space into 23=8 lattices 
and hence the minimum of the LP is 1/8. However, according Eq. (3), the LP T(Aj) 
depends not only on the coverage of Aj, but also on the probability distribution of 
those E over Aj. For example, although “That man is over 100 years old” has larger 
coverage than “That man is about 60 years old”, its LP is much less because P(men’s 
age>100) is very small. Therefore, the smaller LP of a hypothesis means that the 
event described is more specific and more occasional. It is specificity and 
occasionality that Popper uses to explain the severity of tests and his information 
criterion. 
Strictly speaking, the term “logical probability of a proposition” is improper, 
because a proposition only has true vale rather than LP. We could treat the T(Aj) as 
the prior LP of hypothesis hj, and the true value T(Aj|ei) as the posterior LP. Because 
of improper usage of this term, researchers are often puzzled by the question: whether 
larger LP or less LP of a proposition is better? The author believes that less LP and 
larger true value are better (or less prior LP and larger posterior LP are better), 
because the less the LP is, the severer the test is; the larger the true value is, the better 
the hypothesis survives the test. 
When hj is selected, the probability of E is P(E|hj); while hj is true, probability of 
E should be (Author, 19)  
( ) ( | )( | ) ( )
j
j
j
P E T A E
P E A
T A
    (4) 
This formula may be called semantic Bayes' formula, which establishes the 
relationship between SP and LP. In terms of MLE, Aj (or T(Aj|E)) is a predictive 
model, P(E|Aj) is the likelihood function. Note that the peak of likelihood P(E|Aj) is 
between the peak of T(Aj|E) and the peak of P(E) as illustrated by Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Likelihood P(E|Aj) locates between truth function T(Aj|E) and source P(E) 
In the popular methods, P(E|b) is used as the probability distribution of E for 
given background knowledge b. In this paper, equally probable distribution P(E) ≡1/m 
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means no background knowledge; P(E) has carried background knowledge already. In 
other words, P(E) means P(E|b), or say, b is omitted in this paper. The author uses 
P(E) in a way similar to the way Shannon uses P(X). (1948)  
3. Semantic Information Measure for Falsification  
According to classical information theory, relative information formula (Rosie, 
1966) is: 
( | )( ; ) log ( )
i j
i j
i
P e h
I e h
P e
       (5) 
This formula is the core of Shannon’s mutual information formula (1948). 
Averaging I(ei; hj), we will get Shannon’s mutual information I(E; H). However, 
Shannon never used this formula. The reason is that the use of this formula may bring 
negative information; yet Shannon’s formulas of entropy and mutual information only 
measure mean information, which is always positive. The author believes that 
negative information is possible and meaningful to semantic information because if 
we believe lies or wrong predictions, the information will be negative.  
To replace hj in Eq. (5) with hj is true so that Eq. (5) becomes (Author, 19   ): 
( |  is true) ( | )( ; ) log log( ) ( )
i j i j
i j
i i
P e h P e A
I e h
P e P e
     (6) 
This formula is similar to the formula proposed by Popper for severity of tests 
(1963/2005, 526) and the formula proposed by Milne (1996) for DOC. However, 
differences are that 1) The hj is replaced by Aj which clearly means that hj is true 
rather than hj is selected; 2) Background knowledge b is omitted here. According to 
Eq. (4) and (6), we get the Semantic Information Formula (SIF): 
( | )( ; ) log ( )
j i
i j
j
T A e
I e h
T A
      (7) 
which is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 The illustration of semantic information formula 
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Floridi (2004) follows Popper (1963/2005, 526, 534) to emphasize truthlikeness 
or verisimilitude for semantic information. It is T(Aj|E) that is used for truthlikeness. 
The above semantic information measure has three characteristics:  
1. To determine the amount of information, we need to test the prediction by the 
evidence. When the evidence is exactly consistent with the prediction, that is ei=ej, the 
information reaches the maximum. The information decreases as deviation increases. 
When deviation reaches a certain level, information is negative. This relationship just 
right manifests ordinary error criterion. 
2. The smaller the LP T(Aj) (i. e., the lower the horizontal line in Figure 3) is and 
the larger the true value T(Aj|ei) is, the larger the I(ei; hj) is. This exactly manifests 
Popper’s notion: the smaller the logical probability of a hypothesis is, the more 
information there is if it can survive tests.  
3. The information is 0 for a tautology or a contradiction. Popper affirms that a 
tautology contains no information, because it is not testable or logically 
non-falsifiable. The above formula reaches the same conclusion. For a tautology, 
T(Aj|E)≡1, T(Aj)=P(e1)+P(e2)+…+P(em)=1; so, I(ei; hj)=log(1/1)=0. It is also easy to 
avoid Bar-hillel-Carnap Paradox (Floridi, 2004, 2005/2015) by this formula. For a 
contradiction, T(Aj|E) ≡0 and T(Aj) =0. So, I(ei; hj) =log(0/0). Since log(0+/0+) 
=log1=0 (0+ is an infinitesimal). So, it is reasonable to think I(ei; hj) =0 for a 
contradiction.  
Now let’s consider the information of estimation “E≈ej” with the truth function 
T(Aj|E) =exp [-(E-ej)2/(2d2)]. The SIF may be written as 
2 2( ; ) log[ ( | ) / ( )] log[1/ ( )] ( ) / 2 )i j j i j j i jI e h T A e T A T A e e d    （   (8) 
The above formula may be understood as Information= Testing severity - 
Relative deviation. 
Popper defined Testing severity and Verisimilitude (1963/2005, 526, 534). Since 
LP and SP are not well distinguished by him, his definitions are not satisfactory. The 
author suggests defining log [1/T(Aj)] as testing severity, and T(Aj|ei)/T(Aj) as 
verisimilitude. In terms of LM, P(ei|Ai)/P(ei) =T(Aj|ei)/T(Aj) is also called standard 
likelihood. So, we may say  
Semantic information = log (Standard likelihood) 
= log (Verisimilitude)=Testing severity - Relative deviation 
If negative verisimilitude for lies or wrong predictions is expected, one may also 
define verisimilitude by log [T(Aj|ei)/T(Aj)].    
Averaging I(ei; hj) for different i in Eq. (7), we can obtain Average Semantic 
Information (ASI) of hypothesis hj: 
( | )( ; ) ( | ) log ( )
j i
j i j
i j
T A e
I E h P e h
T A
    (9) 
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which is called Average Semantic Information Formula (ASIF) where P(ei| hj), 
i=1, 2… m is sampling distribution from statistics as a group of evidences. According 
to this formula, if there is a counterexample ei for which P(ei| hj)>0 and T(Aj|ei) =0, 
yet T(Aj)0, then the average information is -∞. This coincides with Popper’s 
assertion: One exception is enough to falsify a universal hypothesis. However, this 
assertion can only be applied to non-fuzzy hypotheses. How can we test fuzzy 
hypotheses (such as “People with high Triglyceride probably also have fatty liver” and 
“There will be small to moderate rain tomorrow”)? Popper did not offer a proper 
method. In daily life and the field of Social Science, most hypotheses are fuzzy. The 
above formula allows a reasonable evaluation of these hypotheses under the frame of 
Popper’s theory and avoids negative infinite information.  
The above formula may also be written as 
( | )( ; ) ( | ) log ( )
i j
j i j
i i
P e A
I E h P e h
P e
     (10) 
where P(ei| Aj), i=1, 2… m is likelihood function and may be understood as 
theoretical prediction; P(ei), i. e., P(ei|b), i=1, 2… m may be understood as prior 
likelihood, background knowledge, or context. This formula is a generalization of 
Kullback-Leibler (KL) formula (1951) and may be called Generalized 
Kullback-Leibler Formula (GKLF), which is illustrated in Figure 4. The information 
measured by Eq. (9) and (10) also has coding meaning (Lu, 1994, 2012).  
 
Figure 4 The illustration of generalized Kullback-Leibler formula 
The I(E; hj) may be called generalized KL information. It can be written as the 
difference of two KL divergences: 
( | ) ( | )( ; ) ( | ) log - ( | ) log( ) ( | )
i j i j
j i j i j
i ii i j
P e h P e h
I E h P e h P e h
P e P e A
      (11) 
Since KL divergence is larger than or equal to 0, the information reaches its 
maximum when 
( | ) ( | )i j i jP e A P e h , i=1, 2… m   (12) 
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so that the second part is 0. The maximum is equivalent to the KL information. 
Therefore, KL information is the upper limit of generalized KL information. First, the 
generalized KL information conforms to ordinary error criterion: Consistency is good. 
Second, it ensures that the more different P(E| hj) is from P(E), the more information 
is conveyed if P(E| Aj) is close to P(E| hj). This is the very manifestation of Popper’s 
viewpoint: the more unexpected a prediction is and thus the severer tests it undergoes, 
the more information it conveys if it can survive tests.  
4. Compatibility between Generalized KL Information and 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Akeike (1974) revealed the relationship between KL formula and MLE. The 
author will explain the relationship between GKLF and MLE below.  
Let Z denote an observed condition, C= {z1, z2… zw} be a set of independent 
conditions, and Z∈C. For given Z=zk, the conditional probability of E is P(E| zk). 
Assume some elements in C result in the similar P(E|. ), we merge these elements into 
a subset Cj of C. Then if, and only if Z∈Cj, we select hj. Hence P(E|hj) =P(E|Z∈Cj), 
denoted by P(E|Cj), so that the GKLF becomes 
( | )( ; ) ( | ) log ( )
i j
j i j
i i
P e A
I E h P e C
P e
     (13) 
The likelihood (function) of a predictive model θ (or its parameters’ set) is 
defined as L(θ|E) =P(E|θ). To train the model, we use w samples e(1), e(2)… e(w) ∈
A. Then the likelihood becomes L(θ|Ew) =P(Ew|θ). If these samples are independent, 
then 
P(Ew|θ)=P(e(1)|θ)P(e(1)|θ)…P(e(w)|θ)      (14) 
Assume there are wi samples that are ei among w samples, i=1, 2… m, hence 
( | ( | ) iww i
i
P E P e ）       (15) 
Assume these samples occur under condition Z∈Cj, and w is enough large. 
Hence P(ei|Cj) =wi/w; the logarithm of P(Ew|θ) becomes 
log ( | ) ( | ) log ( | )w i j i
i
P E w P e C P e     (16) 
Compare Eq. (13) and (16), it is easy to find that a fuzzy set Aj is equivalent to a 
model θ. Seeking a truth function T(Aj|E) with optimal parameters that result in the 
maximum I(E; hj) is equivalent to seeking the optimal parameters of the model θ that 
result in the maximum likelihood. The difference is that the semantic information 
method separates model (truth function T(Aj|E)) and source P(E), and gets likelihood 
P(E|Aj) by semantic Bayes’ formula Eq. (4). Yet, the likelihood method does not 
separate them and directly constructs the likelihood P(E|θ). So, the semantic 
information method can be used for MLE when source P(E) is variable. 
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From Eq. (12), we know that the average information I(E; hj) reaches its 
maximum when 
T(Aj|E) =T(Aj)P(hj|E)/P(hj)    (17) 
This is the inverse formula of semantic Bayes’ formula (4). Assume when E=ej*, 
P(hj|E) has the maximum P(hj|ej*). Let the maximum of T(Aj|E) be T(Aj|ej*) =1, we 
get optimized truth function  
T(Aj|E)=P(hj|E)/P(hj| ej*)=P(E|hj)/P(E)/[P(ej*)/P(ej*|hj)]       (18) 
For MLE, if the number (w) of samples is big enough, then the above equation 
becomes 
T(Aj|E)=P(Cj|E)/P(Cj|ej*)=P(E|Cj)/P(E)/ [P(ej*)/P(ej*|Cj)],  j=1, 2… n  (19) 
The above estimation method may be called the Maximum Semantic Information 
Estimation (MSIE). The Eq. (18) or (19) may be called Fuzzy Information Criterion 
(FIC) of estimations.  
Note that the conditional probability function P(H|ej) is normalized; yet P(hj|E) is 
not normalized because the left hj is not a variable. That means that generally, P(hj| 
e1)+ P(hj| e2)+…+ P(hj| em) ≠1 (which may be seen in Table 7). We may call P(hj|E) 
Selecting Rule Function of hj. Note that all P(hj|E), j=1, 2… n, form Shannon’s 
channel P(H|E). So, Eq. (18) indicates how semantic channel matches Shannon 
channel to convey most information. 
Philosopher Weitgenstein has a famous standpoint (1958, 80): the meaning of a 
word lies in its use. Obviously, Eq. (18) supports this standpoint. When the audience 
or listeners continue to improve their understanding, forecasters or speakers also 
continue to improve their selecting rules of sentences, including selecting hj according 
to observed condition Z. Language is evolving in this way.  
5. The Optimization of Degree of Disbelief  
The Degree of Belief (DOB) is a degree to which one believes a hypothesis. It is 
subjective and prior. After the hypothesis is tested by a series of samples, one gets the 
optimized DOB, i.e., DOC. So, DOC is the degree of inductive support (Hawthorne, 
2005). Since now, let’s use b to denote the DOB, b* to denote the optimized b or 
DOC, b’=1-|b| to denote the DOD, and b’* to denote the optimized DOD or degree of 
disconfirmation. 
In his studies of aesthetics and birds’ sexual selection, the author proposed a 
hypothesis that colorful plumages of most male birds were selected by female birds 
and female tastes for beauty came from and indicated their demands for foods or 
environment. For example, the male peacock mimics the berry tree to attract the 
female because they like eating berries. First, the demanding relationship between the 
peacock and berries selected the peacock’s taste for beauty; lately, the female taste for 
beauty selected the male feathers. When the author tried to use statistical data and 
semantic information measure to test and evaluate the hypothesis h1=“Birds with 
yellow feathers like eating nectar or pollen”, he found that increasing the true value of 
counterexamples properly could reduce the information loss and increase the average 
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semantic information I(E; h1). The true value of the counterexamples may be regarded 
as b’, the DOD to h1. The following is the introduction of this method. 
In natural language, to reduce the information loss from counterexamples, we 
may use two methods to increase the fuzziness of hypotheses predictions. One is to 
use words such as “about” or “similar” to increase the fuzziness of a hypothesis by 
decreasing its precision. The d in Eq. (8) indicates the precision. The larger the d is, 
the lower the precision is, and hence the fuzzier the hypothesis is. Another method is 
to use words such as “probably” or “plausibly” to decrease audience’s DOB b. The 
less the b is, the fuzzier (or more like a tautology) the hypothesis is. The audience 
may adjust again the DOB in a hypothesis. For example, generally, people give lower 
DOB to economists’ predictions; slightly higher DOB to weather forecasts and 
medical diagnoses; higher DOB to GPS, watches, and thermometers. For this reason, 
the DOB b of a predicate hj(E) (instead of a proposition) is defined by   
T(hj b|E) =b’+bT(Aj|E), for b>0        (20) 
where hj is the initial hypothesis, which is fuzzy or non-fuzzy; hj b is hj with DOB b; 
b’=1-|b| is the degree of disbelief. This definition actually treats the DOD b’ as the 
proportion of the tautology in the hj with b.  
 Figure 5 shows an example of modifying the true-value of counterexamples from 
0 to b’for the non-fuzzy hypothesis hj=”There wil be small rain (rainfall betwee 0 and 
5 mm) tomorrow”. 
 
Figure 5 Modifying the true-value of non-fuzzy hypothesis from 0 to b’ when 
counterexamples exist. 
A non-fuzzy universal hypothesis is defined as: 
h1=”For all E, if E is in S1, then E is also in S2” 
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where S1 and S2 are two (non-fuzzy) sets. If we believe h1 to some degree b, h1 
becomes a fuzzy hypothesis, denoted by h1b.  
Consider these fuzzy inferences (with more or less counterexamples): “Birds 
with yellow feathers probably like eating nectar or pollen”, “People with high 
triglyceride probably have fatty livers”, “HIV-positive people are very probably 
infected by HIV”, and “Probably all swans are white”. They may be called fuzzy 
universal hypotheses.  
Assume all evidences in A can be divided into two types (as shown in Table 2): 
e1 (in S2) and e0 (not in S2), or four kinds: e11 (in S1 and S2), e00 (not in S1 and not in 
S2), e10 (in S1 and not in S2), and e01 (not in S1 and in S2).  
Table 2 Evidences divided into four types for a universal hypothesis 
E  e1∈S2 e0S2  
E∈S1  e11 e10 
ES1 e01 e00 
 
The fuzzy universal hypothesis h1b is defined as: 
h1b=“For all E, if E is in S1, then E is also in A1” 
where b is the DOB in h1 and A1 is the fuzzified S2; the elements of A1 makes h1b true. 
Let S1’ and S2’ be the supplementary sets of S1 and S2 respectively. We define h0b0 as  
h0b0 =”For all E, if E is in S1’, then E is also in A0” 
where b0 is the DOB in h0 and A0 is the fuzzified S2’; the elements of A0 make h0b0 true. 
For the universal hypothesis h1, T(h1|e11) =1 and T(h1|e10) =0. For the fuzzy universal 
hypothesis h1b, according to Eq. (20), T(A1|e11) =1 and T(A1|e10) =b’. Similarly, 
T(A0|e00) =1 and T(A0 |e01) =b0’. The four truth values of two fuzzy inferences are 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 Four truth values of two fuzzy inferences 
 e1∈S2 e0S2 
E∈S1 , h1b T(A1|e11)=1 T(A1|e10)=b’=1-|b| 
ES1, h0b0 T(A0 |e01)=b0’=1-|b0| T(A0|e00)=1 
 
Let P1=P(e1), P0=P(e0), Q1=P(e1|h1) and Q0=P(e0|h1). Using Eq. (3), we get T(A1) 
=b’P0+P1. Using Eq. (9), we get  
1 0 1
0 1 0 1
' 1( ; ) log log' '
b bI E h Q Q
b P P b P P
      (21) 
According to the above formula, when b=1 or b’=0 which means that the 
listeners fully believe h1, if there is a counterexample, the information will be -∞. 
When b=0 or b’=1 which means that the listeners do not believe h1 at all, the average 
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information is 0. We can seek b’ (for 0≤b’≤1) that makes I(E; h1b) reach its maximum 
(see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 6 Information I(E; h1b) changes with degree of disbelief b’ 
for P0/P1=0.8/0.2; Q0/Q1=0.25/0.75 
Let derivative dI(E; h1b)/db’=0, we get Q0P1-Q1P0b’=0. Hence there is 
b’*= (Q0/Q1)/(P0/P1)      (22) 
Since the second derivative is less than 0 for b’= b’*. So, b’* is the optimized b’ 
that maximizes I(E; h1b). 
 Below is the discussion about Eq. (22) only for cases where Q0/Q1<P0/P1. If 
Q0/Q1>P0/P1, we need another formula to get b’*.  
When P0<P1, P0/P1 may be called prior Absolute Degree of Disbelief (ADOB); 
when Q0<Q1, Q0/Q1 may be called posterior ADOD. So, b’* may be regarded as the 
decrement of ADOD. If P0=P1=0.5, then P0/P1=1 and b’*= Q0/Q1 which means that 
without background knowledge P(E), the b’* is equal to the posterior ADOD. From 
ADOD, we could get absolute conformation measure (Huber, 2005).   
 From Eq. (20) and (22), we get 
b*=1-(Q0/Q1)/(P0/P1)    (23) 
If Q0=0 and P0>0, then b’*=0 and b*=1, which means the hypothesis h1 is 
completely confirmed. Eq. (22) may also be written as b’*=(Q0/P0)/(Q1/P1) which 
means that DOD decreases with counterexamples’ decreasing and positive examples’ 
increasing. According to Eq. (18), we may directly get  
b’*= (Q0/P0)/(Q1/P1) =P(h1|e10)/P(h1|e11)   (24) 
So, there is also  
b*=1-b’*=1- P(h1|e10)/ P(h1|e11)  (25) 
which means that the DOC of h1 is only related to selecting rule function P(h1|E) and 
truth function T(h1|E) but source P(E). Note that test or semantic information is 
related to P(E). 
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 The Eq. (23) looks like a formula from Likelihoodism, yet the Eq. (25) looks like 
a formula from Bayesianism. The Eq. (24) shows that Likelihoodism and Bayesianism  
(Fitelson, 2007) can be compatible when sampling distribution is used to confirm a 
hypothesis or its truth function (conditional LP function). However, every P in above 
eqations means SP rather than LP. The conditional LP (function) is to be confirmed, 
and hence does not occur in these formulas. Otherwise, that is to let itself support 
itself.  
With the semantic Bayes’ formula (4), we can use b’* and P(e1) to calculate 
predicted probability of e1, denoted by P(e1|h1b*). That is  
P(e1|h1b*)=P(e1)/[P(e1)+b’*P(e0)]    (26) 
Figure 6 shows how P(e1|h1b*) and I(E; h1b*) are positively related to b*. 
 
Figure 7 Relations of b* to accuracy rate P(e1|h1b*) and information I(E; h1b*) 
for prior probability P(e1)=0.2. 
Now we use both b* and I(E; h1b*) to evaluate and compare two hypotheses. 
There are 843 representative birds in the book The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Birds 
of the World (Alderton, 2005). Those birds could be divided into four types by 
whether they have yellow feathers (including orange feathers) and whether they eat 
nectar (including pollen), as shown in Table 4, where n11 is the number of e11, and so 
on. 
Table 4 The optimization of the degrees of disbelief b’ about birds 
 eating nectar (e1) not eating (e0) 
with yellow feathers (h1) n11= 83 n10=57 
without yellow feathers (h0) n01=17 n00=686 
P(h1|E) n11/( n01+n11)=0.830 n10/( n00+ n10)=0.0767 
T(A1b|E) 1 b’*=0.0924 
 
According to Eq. (25) and Table 4, there is 
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* 10 01 1110 11
00 10 01 11 11 00 10
( )' ( )
n n nn nb
n n n n n n n
      (27) 
Hence, b’*=0.0924, b*=1-b’*=1-0.0924=0.908, and I(h1b, E) =0.923 bit. This 
information is equal to the KL information. 
Consider inference h1= “If a person has high triglyceride, then he also has fatty 
liver”. Data from health examines of 142 people3 are shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5 The optimization of the degrees of disbelieve b’ about fatty liver 
numbers fatty liver (e1) non-fatty liver (e0) 
high triglyceride (h1) n11=25 n10=16 
low triglyceride (h0) n01=41 n00=60 
T(A1|E) 1 b’*=0.556 
 
According to Table 5, the DOC b*=0.444 and the information I(E; h1b*) =0.025 
bit. Comparing the two inferences, obviously the inference about birds is more 
informative and more believable then the inference about fatty liver. 
6. Raven Paradox and Rapid HIV Tests   
Hempel (1945) describes the paradox in terms of the hypothesis:  
(1) “All ravens are black”. 
It is equivalent to: 
(2) “All non-black things are not ravens”. 
A non-black non-raven thing (e00) such as a white chalk supports (2) and hence 
also supports (1). Yet, according common knowledge, a white chalk is irrelative to (1). 
So, there is a paradox. There have been many articles about this paradox. (Good, 1960; 
Scheffler and Goodman, 1972; Maher, 1999; Fitelson and Hawthorne, 2010) 
Now let s1= “E is in S1”, s2 = “E is in S2”, and s1->s2 = “If E is in S1 then E is in 
S2”, and so on. To resolve the paradox, there are two ways generally. One is to deny 
Equivalence Condition (EC) (s1->s2 is equivalent to ¬s2->¬s1); another is to deny 
Irrelevance (e00 is irrelative to s1->s2). Most researchers like Hempel affirm the EC 
and deny the Irrelevance, and believe e11 can support h1 better than e00 (Fitelson and 
Hawthorne, 2010). Like Scheffler and Goodman (1972), the author also denies the EC 
and emphasizes falsification. Unlike almost all researchers, the author argues that for 
inference h1=s1->s2, in many cases, an evidence e00 can support h1 better than e11. 
                                                 
3 From figue 1 in this page: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2829436/. Fatty liver 
patients include borderline and NASH groups.  
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For a general universal hypothesis, there are four kinds of inferences as shown in 
Table 6. Each inference has a particular pair of positive example and counterexample. 
For h1= s1->s2, the positive example is e11 and the counterexample is e10. For 
h2=¬s2->¬s1, the counterexample is also e10, but the positive example is e00. In 
Mathematical Logic, h1=h2; however, in fuzzy logic or probability logic, h1b1 and h2b2 
should be different because their proportion of counterexamples to positive examples 
are different.  
Table 6 Four kinds of inferences and their positive examples and counterexamples 
 h3=s2->s1 h2=¬s2->¬s1 
h1=s1->s2 positive example e11 counterexample e10 
h0=¬s1->¬s2 counterexample e01 positive example e00 
 
According Eq. (27), h1 and h2 should be given different degrees of 
disconfirmation (the optimized DOD): 
* 10 11
1
00 10 01 11
n nb
n n n n
      (28) 
* 10 00
2
11 10 01 00
n nb
n n n n
      (29) 
The partial derivatives of b1*=1-b1’* with respect to n11 and n00 respectively are:  
*
10 011
2
11 00 10 11( )
n nb
n n n n
       (30)  
*
10 01 111
2
00 11 00 10
( )
( )
n n nb
n n n n
      (31) 
The two partial derivatives tell us how much the two different positive examples 
e11 and e00 raise respectively the DOC of h1. Assume n=n11+n00+n10+n01 is much 
greater than 1. Then 11*1 nb   is the increment of b1* raised by a new single 
evidence e11, and 00*1 nb  is the increment of b1* raised by new e00.  
Why do people think that a non-black non-raven thing (such as a white chalk) is 
irrelative to “All ravens are black”? Firstly, people have never seen non-black raven, 
which means n10 =0 and n11>0. So b1* =1, no matter how big n00 is. If E∈A that only 
includes birds and h1 =“Most swans are white”, then it should be acceptable by most 
researchers that an evidence e00 (a non-white non-swan thing) supports h1. If h1 refers 
to the result of rapid HIV + (positive) and means “This person has infected by HIV 
probably”, an evidence e00 (a noninfected person whose rapid HIV test shows 
negative) should also supports h1.  
Secondly, as some researchers have pointed out (Good, 1960), for “All ravens 
are black”, the number n00 of e00 (non-black non-raven thing) is very big so that an 
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evidence e00 can hardly affect h1 even if there are some counterexamples. Eq. (31) 
supports this idea since when n00 is much bigger then n01, 00*1 nb  is close to 0.    
Almost all researchers believe that evidence e11 can support h1 better than e00 
(Fitelson and Hawthorne, 2010). However, according to Eq. (30) and (31), we can 
draw a different conclusion. When (1+n11/n01)n11-n10>n00, 11*100*1 nbnb  . For 
example, assuming n11=n01=10n10, then when n11>n00/1.9, 11*100*1 nbnb  . This 
means that in many cases, e00 can support h1 better than e11. This conclusion is 
unexpected.  
We may also use Eq. (28) to get similar conclusion. Assuming n00 is much 
greater than n10 and n11= n01, when n00 doubles, b1’* reduces almost half; yet, when 
n11 doubles, b1’* only reduces 1/4. So, in many cases, the increment of n00 can reduce 
the degree of disconfirmation of h1 faster than the increment of n11.      
Let’s use OREQuick HIV tests4 to show the importance of e00 as the evidence 
for confirmation of h1. The result of a HIV Test is either + (positive) or – (negative). 
The h1 becomes + and h0 becomes -. For a given patient with HIV e1, the conditional 
probability of + is P(+|e1), which is called sensitivity by medical industry. For 
HIV-noninfected people, the conditional probability of - is P(-|e0), which is called 
specificity (as shown in Table 7). 
Table 7 P(+|E) and P(-|E) for OREQuick HIV Tests 
 with HIV (e1) without HIV (e0) 
P(+|E) sensitivity=0.917 1-specificity=0.001 
P(-|E) 1-sensitivity=0.083 specificity=0.999 
 
According to Eq. (24), b1’*=P(+|e0)/P(+|e1) = (1-specificity)/sensitivity 
=0.001/0.917≈0.0011; b1*=1-0.0011=0.9989; I(E; + b1*) =5.52 bits. For testing result -, 
b0’*= (1-sensitivity)/specificity=0.083/0.999=0.083; b0*=1-0.083=0.917; I(E; -b0*) 
=0.04 bit. 
It is easy to notice that specificity is more important to raise the DOC of h1=+ 
than sensitivity. For example, even if sensitivity is 0.5 (or 0.1), as long as specificity 
is 1, then b1* will be 1, which means that it is absolutely believable to diagnose AIDS 
according to +. If specificity is 0.5, even if sensitivity is 1, then b1* will be only 0.5, 
which means that it is half believable to diagnose AIDS according to +. Similarly, we 
can prove that sensitivity is more important to raise the DOC of - than specificity. The 
reason is that less counterexamples are more important than more positive examples 
for us to believe a hypothesis. 
                                                 
4  http://www.oraquick.com/taking‐the‐test/understanding‐your‐results   
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When n is big enough, specificity=n00/(n00+n10) and sensitivity=n11/(n11+n01). So, 
n00 is related to specificity. That is why e00 can support h1 better than e11 in many 
cases. 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) (=sensibility/(1-specificity=1/b’*) is used by medical 
community to tell how good the test-positive is. It is easy to find that b* is positively 
related to LR. The difference is the upper limit of b* is 1 so that b* is suitable as DOC. 
In addition, b’* can be used to predict the probability in which the testee has disease.  
Statisticians and some doctors often argue about the reliability of medical tests. If 
the prior probability P(e1) or P(HIV) of a person with HIV is about 0.004, then 
according to Bayes’ formula, the posterior probability 
P(e1|+)=0.917*0.004/(0.001*0.996+0.917*0.004)=0.786, which is not high enough. If 
the prior probability P(e1) is 0.0001 instead of 0.004, the posterior probability P(e1|+) 
will be 0.08. Can we still believe the test? The author answers “yes” as most doctors. 
Actually this degree b1*=0.9989 is irrelative to the prior probability P(e1) or which 
group of people the testee belongs to. To predict the probability in which the testee 
has AIDS by +, most statisticians are right; yet, to believe the HIV Test or not, most 
doctors are right. However, to predict the probability, we may use the semantic bayes’ 
formula Eq. (26). For example, for a testee who belongs to high-risk group of people, 
P(e1) =0.1. Then P(e1|h1b*) =0.1/(0.1+0.0011*0.9) =0.991. This result is the same as 
P(e1|+) obtained by Bayes’ formula. Yet, Eq. (26) is simpler. 
The popular confirmation measures, such as d(H, E) (Earman, 1992) and s(H, E) 
(Christensen, 1999; Joyce, 1999), use LP and conditional LP. One can get the LP 
from prior knowledge and the conditional LP from one or two evidences, without 
using sensibility and specificity. Yet it is difficult to apply them to medical tests. One 
may argues that they are used for the increments of DOC. Yet, as increments, they are 
too big. If more evidences come, how do we deal with the measures? As comparison, 
this paper uses Eq. (15) and (16) for the increments of DOC. 
If we replace LP with SP in d(H, E), d(+, E) will decreases with P(e1) increasing. 
This is unreasonable. When specificity is 1 and sensibility is 0.1, to predict the 
probability P(e1|+) by Bayes’ formula or the semantic Bayes’ formula, P(e1|+)=1, 
which means the prediction is 100% correct. Yet, both d(+, E) and s(+, E) are less 
than 0.1. For 100% accuracy predicted by +, so low DOCs are unreasonable.  
Why no others have proposed the b*? The reason might be that according to Eq. 
(23), b* might be -∞, and its upper limit (1) and lower limit (-∞) are asymmetrical. 
Yet, using the semantic information method, the negative DOC needs another formula 
and its lower limit is -1.  
7. Negative DOC with “All swans are white” as Example   
First, consider the positive DOC for h1=”All swans are white”. Assuming that the 
posterior ADOD Q0/Q1=0.01/0.99 is less than the prior ADOD P0/P1=0.2/0.8 (see 
Table 8), then the DOC b* is positive. According to Eq. (24), we get 
b’*= (Q0/Q1)/(P0/P1) = (0.01/0.99) =0.0404; b*=1-b’*=0.9596. 
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Table 8 Positive DOC for “All swans are white” (b*>0) 
 white swan (e1) non-white swan (e0) average information 
P(E) 0.8 0.2  
P(E|h1) 0.99 0.01 IKL(E; h1)=0.2611 bit 
T(h1|E) 1 0 I(E; h1)=-∞ 
T(h1b*|E) 1 b’*=0.0404 I(E; h1b*)=0.2611 bit 
 
However, for a lie or wrong hypothesis, such as “All swans are not white”, or a 
prediction from a stock commentator who is seen as a contrary indicator, or a 
hypothesis with excessive affirmation, we may modify the DOB into negative value to 
get more average semantic information. 
When a negative DOB b (b<0) is given to a general hypothesis hj, hj becomes hjb, 
whose the truth function is defined as 
T(hjb |E) =1+bT(hj|E), for b<0      (32) 
Now the DOD b’=1-|b|=1+b.  
Figure 5 illustrates how positive b and negative b affect T(h1b |E). 
Now consider that counterexamples increase so that the DOC b* of h1=“All 
swans are white” is negative. Assuming the prior ADOD is 0.01/0.99, the posterior 
ADOD increases to 0.05/0.95 after more black swans occur (as shown in Table 10).  
 
Figure 8 How positive b and negative b affect T(h1b |E) 
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Table 9 Negative DOC for “All swans are white” (b*<0) 
 white swan (e1) non-white swan (e0) average information 
P(E) 0.99 0.01  
P(E|h1) 0.95 0.05 IKL(E; h1)= 0.060 bit  
T(h1|E) 1 0 I(E; h1)=-∞ 
T(h1b*|E) b’*= 0.192 1 I(E; h1b*)=0.060 bit  
 
According to Eq. (3) and (32), we get T(A1) = P0+ b’P1. According to Eq. (9) and 
(32), we get  
1 0 1
0 1 0 1
1 '( ; ) log log' '
b bI E h Q Q
P b P P b P
      (33) 
To optimize b, P0>0 is needed. Assuming P0>0 and derivative dI(E; h1b)/db’=0, 
then 
b’*= (P0/P1)/(Q0/Q1)         (34) 
where (P0/P1)/(Q0/Q1) must be less than 1, otherwise Eq. (22) is needed. 
According to Eq. (32), we have 
b*=b’*-1= (P0/P1)/(Q0/Q1)-1       (35) 
Therefore, when the posterior ADOD increases from 0.01/0.99 to 0.05/0.95, b’*= 
(0.01/0.99)/(0.05/0.95) =0.192; b*= b’*-1=-0.808. 
According to Eq. (35), if Q0>Q1, the posterior ADOD should be negative and 
equal to Q1/Q0-1. Similarly, if P0>P1, the prior ADOD is equal to P1/P0-1<0. 
It is not that only Eq. (34) is used to get negative DOC. The Eq. (22) can also be 
used to get negative DOC for excessive negation. The Eq. (34) can also be used to get 
positive DOC for proper negation (as shown in Table 10).  
Theorem 1. A denial hypothesis h0(E) =¬h1(E) with negative DOB b0 is equal to 
the affirmative hypothesis h1(E) with positive DOB |b0|, i. e.,  
T(h0b0|E) =T (h1|b0||E), for Q0/Q1≤P0/P1 and b0<0  (36) 
Proof: According to fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965), T(h0|E) =1-T(h1|E). According to 
Eq. (20) and the fuzzy logic, T(h0b0|E) =1+b0T(h0|E) =1+b0(1-T(h1|E)) =1+b0-b0T(h1|E). 
According to Eq. (20), 1+b0-b0T(h1|E) =1-|b0|+| b0|T(h1|E) = T (h1|b0||E). Hence T(h0b0|E) 
= T (h1|b0||E). 
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Table 10 DOC in 4 cases and the meanings of hypotheses with DOC 
Initial hypotheses The ratio of counterexamples 
decreases: Q0/Q1≤P0/P1 
b’*= (Q0/ Q1)/(P0/P1) 
The ratio of counterexamples 
increases: Q0/ Q1>P0/P1 
b’*= (P0/P1)/(Q0/ Q1) 
h1(E)=“All swans 
are white” 
b*=1-(Q0/Q1)/(P0/P1)>0  
for proper affirmation, 
h1b*≈”There are more white 
swans than we expect” 
b*=(P0/P1)/ (Q0/ Q1)-1<0  
for excessive affirmation, 
h1b*≈”There are less white swans 
than we expect” 
h0(E)=”All swans 
are not white” 
b0*=(Q0/Q1)/(P0/P1)-1=-b*<0 
for excessive negation, 
h0b0*≈”There are less non-white 
swans than we expect”=”There 
are more white swans than we 
expect”≈h1|b0*|=h1b* 
b0*=1-(P0/P1)/(Q0/ Q1)=|b*|>0  
for proper negation, h0b0*≈”There 
are more non-white swans than we 
expect”=”There are less white 
swans than we expect”≈h1-b0*=h1b* 
 
Theorem 2. A denial hypothesis h0(E) =¬h1(E) with positive DOB b0 is equal to 
the affirmative hypothesis h1(E) with negative DOB –b0, i. e. 
T(h0b0|E) =T (h1-b0|E), for Q0/Q1>P0/P and b0>0  (37) 
Proof: T(h0b0|E)= 1-b0+b0T(h0|E) =1-b0+b0(1-T(h1|E)) 
=1-b0T(h1|E)=1+(-b0)T(h1|E)=T(h1-b0|E). 
The adjustment of DOB to increase its average information cannot be applied to 
all hypotheses or predictions. Most blind guesses do not convey positive average 
information, no matter how their DOB are adjusted. For example, if someone always 
predicts the rises or falls of stock markets by throwing a coin, then the DOC of his 
prediction can only be 0. Most wrong hypotheses still cannot convey meaningful 
positive information even if their DOBs are adjusted into negative values. For 
example, wrong prediction “Tomorrow is the end of the world” with any DOB can 
only convey information close to or less than 0.  
8. The Degree of Confirmation of General Hypotheses 
In Section 5, a fuzzy universal hypothesis is be formalized as h1b=”For all E, if E
∈S1, then E∈A1”. Now consider weather forecasts, GPS, and various fuzzy 
hypotheses, including fuzzy inferences and predictions. A general fuzzy hypothesis is 
formalized as: 
hj or hjb =“For all E and Z, if Z∈Cj, then E∈Aj” 
GPS is a good example of general hypotheses. Now E denotes the real position 
of a GPS device, H denotes the position pointed by GPS arrow. If E=ei and H=hj=êj, 
then êj is the estimation of ei by GPS according to condition Z (the distances to three 
or more satellites and other factors).    
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The initial hypothesis hj may be fuzzy or non-fuzzy. By making some 
assumptions for simplicity so that the initial hypothesis is non-fuzzy, we can also 
calculate the DOC b* of êj provided by GPS as above. 
Circular Error Probability (CEP)5 is often used to express the accuracy of GPS. 
The CEP=10 meters means that for a given position ei of GPS device, the probability 
in which the estimation hj=êj from ei is not farther than 10 meters is 0.5. Let Si denote 
the circle with 10 meter radius surrounding center ei. Then CEP=10 meters means that 
for give ei, the probability of correct estimations (êj in Si) is 
ˆ
ˆ( | ) 0.5
j i
j i
e S
P e e

 , the 
probability of wrong estimations is 1-0.5=0.5. Let’s simply assume that P(êj |ei) for all 
correct estimations are the same and equal to p1, and P(êj |ei) for all wrong estimations 
are the same and equal to p0; the number of all positions in a circle with 10 meter 
radius is n, and the number of all possible positions is 1000n. Then there are p1=0.5/n, 
and p0=0.5/(999n). Hence, according to Eq. (24) and (25), 
b’*=p0/p1=0.5/(999n)/(0.5/n) =1/999; b*=1-b’*=998/999.  
If the initial hypothesis hj is fuzzy, we may seek the DOB b* that makes the 
average semantic information reach the maximum: 
* ( | )arg max ( ; ) arg max ( | ) log ( )
b
j ib
j i j b
b b i j
T h e
b I E h P e h
T h
    (38) 
which is the definition of the DOC of a general hypothesis. 
Another popular measure for GPS accuracy is Distance Root Mean Square 
(DRMS) 6. DRMS=10 means that the standard deviation between Ê and ei is 10 
meters. Generally we consider that P(Ê |ei) as a normal distribution: 
2 2ˆ ˆ( | ) exp[ | | / (2 )]i iP E e k E e d     (39) 
where k is normalized coefficient; ei is the real position of the GPS device; Ê is the 
estimation of ei; d is DRMS or standard deviation which implies the precision of GPS. 
The DRMS=10 means that possibility in which the deviation within 10 meters is 65%. 
In this case, the initial hypothesis hj is fuzzy. Assume Eq. (39) is tenable for different 
E, hence there is  
2 2ˆ ˆ( | ) exp[- | - | /(2 )]P E E k E E d    (40) 
However, the above distribution is only for ideal estimation. The actual estimation 
may be the function of condition Z, i. e., Ê=f(Z). The deviation distribution may be  
2 2ˆ ˆ( | ) exp[ | | / (2 )]P E E k E e E d c         (41) 
                                                 
5  http://www.igage.com/mp/GPSAccuracy.htm   
6see http://www.radio‐electronics.com/info/satellite/gps/accuracy‐errors‐precision.php   
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where Δe is systematic deviation (Δe=0 means the highest accuracy); c mean that 
there are more long distance deviations, which come from wrong map or systematic 
failure. It is the c that determines the DOC b* of Ê. To confirm H=Ê, the average 
semantic information becomes semantic mutual information: 
( | )ˆ ˆ( ; ) ( ) ( | ) log ( )
b
j ib
j i j b
j i j
T h e
I E H P e P e e
T h
   (42) 
Assuming the optimized truth function is  
* * 2 *2 *ˆ ˆ( | ) exp[ | | ) / (2 ] 1bk kT e E b e E d b     , k=1, 2 … (43) 
by using Eq. (34) and (18), we can derive that when êk=êj-Δe (j=1, 2…), d*=d, 
b*=1-c/(k+c), the semantic mutual information I(E; Hb*) reaches the maximum. From 
this example, it is easy to find that we need to consider three factors: accuracy, 
precision, and DOC for selecting a hypothesis from many with information criterion. 
If E is not equally probable, LP T(Aj) is a better measure than d as precision because 
T(Aj) is also related to P(E) and determines the testing severity. Actually, optimizing 
T(H|E) with P(H|E) is optimizing semantic channel so that it matches Shannon’s 
channel. 
If a GPS user wants to confirm or optimize the estimation êj (or Ê), he needs 
P(êj|E), which cannot be obtained directly. Since when E is equally probable, i. e., 
P(E)=a (a is a constant), we could derive P(Ê)=a, and P(êj|E)=P(E|êj)=P(E, êj)/a. So, 
the user may put the GPS device at different positions in equal probability to record E 
and Ê. Then he could get P(Ê, E) and P(êj|E), j=1 2… n. If the probability distribution 
P(E|êj) of samples is obtained when P(E)≠constant, one could, according to Eq. (19), 
use P(E|êj)/P(E) to replace P(êj|E) to confirm êj. 
In comparison with MLE, MSIE has two advantages: 1) The MSIE can be used 
in cases where source P(E) is variable; 2) Generally, P(hj|E) is more regular than 
P(E|hj) so that it is easier to construct T(Aj|E) proportional to P(hj|E) than to construct 
P(E|Aj) close to P(E|hj). For example, P(E|Aj) predicted by GPS will not be a normal 
distribution and changes from place to place because roads are irregular; yet, P(hj|E) 
is an approximately normal distribution and almost changeless.   
9. Conclusions and Discussions 
In this paper, the semantic information measure is used as the main tool for 
falsification and confirmation. This measure is compatible with Shannon’s theory, 
Popper’s theory, and Fisher’s likelihood method. With generalized Kullback-Lribler 
formula, we can use objective sampling distribution to test subjective probability 
prediction (likelihood function); use objective selecting rule function (or Shannon 
channel) to confirm subjective truth function (or semantic channel). The basic 
conclusions about falsification and confirmation are: 1) For the falsification 
(including test, selection, and optimization) of hypotheses, we need semantic 
information as criterion, which means that the more prior precise and unexpected and 
the more posterior accurate and believable a hypothesis is, the more information it 
conveys and hence the better it is. 2) Confirmation, for which less counterexamples 
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are more important than more positive examples, is to get the optimized degrees of 
belief in hypotheses to increase average semantic information, and hence is a helper 
of falsification.  
MSIE and MLE use the same semantic information criterion in essence and 
compatible with Shannon’s information theory. But, the MSIE is more suitable to 
cases where source P(E) is variable, channel P(H|E) is stable and regular, and the 
amount of ample are huge. 
The MSIE requires that samples are independent and their distribution is stable. 
If there are only fewer samples, the distribution P(E|hj) may be unstable and will 
result in over fitting. To resolve this problem, we may decrease the degree of 
confirmation obtained according to the samples. Can we set up the relationship 
between the number of samples and the degree of confirmation, or prior limit the 
extents of precision and degree of belief in cases with fewer samples? This is a 
question that needs further study. 
The Maximum A Posterior (MAP) estimation (DeGroot, 1970) may get better 
results when there are fewer samples. Besides likelihood, MAP also use prior 
probability P(θ) or P(hj). Yet MAP is not compatible with Shannon’s information 
theory. Is the prior probability P(θ) statistical or logical? This could be a question. 
Similarly, the MSIE uses the prior probability distribution P(E) and similar Bayes 
formula (P(hj|E) =…). In cases with fewer samples, how could we make full use of 
prior knowledge better？This deserves further studies as well.   
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Appendix: List of Symbols 
 
A={e1, e2…} is a set of evidences, ei—one element in A  
E∈A is a variable 
Aj is a fuzzy subset of A; the elements in Aj make hypothesis hj be true 
B= {h1, h2…} is a set of hypotheses; hj is one element in B; H∈B is a variable 
C= {z1, z2…} is a set of conditions; Cj is a subset of C. When Z∈Cj, hj is selected. 
hj(ei)—a proposition, such as hj(ei) =“ei≈ej”; hj(E)—a predicate, such as, hj(E) =”E≈ej” 
hjb—hj whose degree of belief is b 
T—logical probability or true value; T(hj) =T(Aj)—logical probability of hj= hj(E) 
T(hj|ei) =T(Aj|ei) — true value of a proposition hj(ei) 
T(hj|E) =T(Aj|E)—truth function of a predicate hj(E) 
P- Statistical probability; P(E)—prior probability (function), or source, P(ei)—the 
prior probability of ei 
P(hj)—statistical or selective probability of hj 
T(hj) =T(Aj)—logical probability or average true value of hj(E) 
P(E|Aj) =P(E)T(Aj|E)/T(Aj)—9 probability, or theoretical prediction 
P(E|hj) =P(E)P(hj|E)/P(hj)—sampling distribution, inverse condition probability 
P(hj|E)—conditional probability, selective probability (function) of hj 
e(t)—the evidence under t-th condition z(t), t=1, 2… w. e(t)∈A 
Assume the number of ei in {e(t), e(t)…e(w)} is wi and w is enough big, then P(ei|Cj) 
=wi/w.  
P(E|Cj) =P(E|Z∈Cj)=P(E|hj) is the sampling distribution on A under conditions in Cj.  
P(E|Aj)—likelihood 
b— Degree of Belief (DOB)；b’=1-|b|--Degree of Disbelief (DOD) 
b*-- Degree of Confirmation (DOC), i. e., optimized DOB 
b’*--optimized degree of disbelief 
ADOD—Absolute degree of disbelief 
I(ei; hj)—semantic information conveyed by hj about ei 
I(E; hj)—average information conveyed by hj about E 
KL--Kullback-Leibler  
GKLF—generalized Kullback-Leibler Formula 
LP—logical probability;  
SP—statistical probability or selected probability 
SIM—Semantic Information Measure 
MLE—Maximum likelihood estimation 
MSIE—Maximum semantic information estimation 
 
